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Preface
This brief by Yeva Nersisyan and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray
argues that deficits do not burden future generations with debt
nor do they crowd out private spending. The authors base their
conclusions on the premise that a sovereign nation with its own
currency cannot become insolvent, and that government financ-
ing is unlike that of a household or firm. Moreover, they observe
that automatic stabilizers, notgovernment bailouts and the stim-
ulus package, have prevented the U.S. economic contraction
from devolving into another Great Depression. The authors dis-
pense with the (unsubstantiated) concerns about deficits and
debts, noting that they mask the real issue: the unwillingness of
deficit hawks to allow a (democratic) government to work for
the good of the people. 
It is important to explain why sustained budget deficits are
not a threat because further fiscal expansions may be required,
resulting in larger and more prolonged deficits than those pro-
jected. The authors point out that the relevant debt figure is the
amount of Treasuries held by the public. In this case, the gov-
ernment liability is exactly offset by nongovernment sector assets,
and interest payments by the government generate income for
the nongovernment sector. In reality, we leave our grandchildren
with government bonds that represent net financial assets and
wealth. Moreover, deficits today do not commit future genera-
tions to raise taxes. The historical approach is to retain inherited
debt and rely on a growing economy to reduce the debt ratio. 
Fear that countries such as China will suddenly stop buying
Treasuries, and thus “financing,” the U.S. economy is misplaced,
since the United States is willing to simultaneously run trade and
government budget deficits. Other countries’ eagerness to run a
trade surplus with the United States is linked to the desire for dol-
lar assets, so these are not independent decisions. The complex
linkages between balance sheets and actions will ensure that tran-
sitions are moderate and slow. Thus, the current relationships will
persist much longer than presumed by most commentators.
In terms of the notion that balanced budgets are desirable
for households and firms, and therefore for governments, the
authors point out that, unlike most governments, households
and firms have a relatively limited lifespan, and that they do not
have the power to levy taxes, issue currency, or demand that taxes
be paid in the currency issued. They also point out that almost
every significant reduction of the outstanding U.S. debt has been
followed by a depression, as budget surpluses reduce non-
government sector net saving, income, and wealth.
The U.S. federal government is the sole issuer of the dollar,
and it spends by crediting bank deposits. Therefore, it can always
service its debt, since tax and bond revenues are not required in
order to spend. Thus, perpetual budget deficits are “sustainable.”
Moreover, large (nondiscretionary) budget deficits almost always
result from recessions because automatic stabilizers (not discre-
tionary spending) place a floor under aggregate demand. As a
result, the authors caution,taxes should not be raised while there
is still danger of further unemployment and deflation. 
Guided by flawed economic thinking, governments world-
wide have imposed unnecessary constraints on their fiscal capac-
ity to fully utilize their labor resources. Bond sales by a sovereign
government, for example, are completely voluntary and self-
imposed. While there may be real resource constraints on gov-
ernment spending, there are no financial constraints. 
Deficit critics fail to understand the differences between the
monetary arrangements of sovereign and nonsovereign nations,
and that eurozone countries such as Greece have given up their
monetary sovereignty. By divorcing their fiscal and monetary
authorities, these nonsovereign nations have relinquished their
public sector’s capacity to provide high levels of employment and
output. In lieu of exiting the eurozone and regaining control of
domestic policy space, Nersisyan and Wray suggest that the euro-
zone countries create a supranational fiscal authority similar to
the U.S. Treasury that is able to spend like a sovereign government. 
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
May 2010Public Policy Brief, No. 111 4
Deficit Hysteria Redux
Introduction
When it comes to federal budget deficits there appear to be only
two respectable positions. The first is the “deficit hawk” position:
deficits are never acceptable because they lead to complete
crowding-out;that is, every dollar of government spending is off-
set by a dollar of private spending. Indeed, for the long run it is
even worse, because government debt will have to be repaid in the
future, which means higher taxes and less private spending. Hence,
the stimulus package did not save any jobs and will actually cost us
jobs later. This is a minority view among economists and policy-
makers, although it remains popular among some Republicans
who have a political interest in denying that the Democrats and
the Obama administration have done anything right.
The second view is the “deficit dove” position: deficits are
probably acceptable for the short run, and perhaps even neces-
sary to save the economy from another Great Depression.
However, the benefits we receive today are partially offset by costs
in the future, when we will need to tighten our belts to repay the
debt. Even President Obama has argued that today’s deficits will
impose a heavy burden on our grandchildren, and warned that
“we cannot continue to borrow against our children’s future”
(February 1, 2010). This is why he is already proposing budget
freezes for the year after next. Other deficit doves are somewhat
more tolerant of near-term budget shortfalls than the president,
but they still worry about long-term pain, citing the imminent
retirement of baby boomers and concomitant increase in “enti-
tlement” spending. Thus, it is all the more necessary to get the
budget “under control” as quickly as possible.
Finally, a new and influential study by Carmen Reinhart and
Kenneth Rogoff (2009a) purports to show that economic growth
slows dramatically—by at least one percentage point—once the
gross debt–to-GDP ratio crosses the threshold of 90 percent.
President Obama’s proposed budget will soon cross that line,
with the debt-to-GDP ratio reaching 103 percent by 2015.1That
would drop per capita GDP growth in the United States by over
half from a long-run potential of 2.5 percent per year—“the dif-
ference between a strong economy that can project global power
and a stagnant, ossified society” (Boskin 2010). At that pace, liv-
ing standards would rise so slowly that improvement would
barely be noticed—good-bye, American dream.
In this brief, we present a third view that receives virtually no
media attention. We argue that today’s deficits do not burden
future generations with debt that must be repaid, nor do they
crowd out private spending now or in the future. The Reinhart
and Rogoff findings and both of the conventional views cannot
be applied to the situation of the United States, or to any other
nation that operates with a sovereign currency (that is, a national
currency with a floating exchange rate, and with no promise to
convert to another currency at a fixed exchange rate). 
Our arguments are not really new—they can be found in
numerous Levy Institute publications over the past two decades.
Nor is the deficit hysteria new; it returns predictably on cue, like
an undead monster in a horror flick, to constrain rational policy
when a downturn causes the deficit to grow. In the current case,
however, the stakes are higher than they have been since the
1930s. Our economy faces such strong headwinds that it requires
a fiscal expansion that could result in even larger and perhaps
more prolonged deficits than those now projected. Thus, it is
more important than ever to explain why sustained budget
deficits do not threaten our future. 
Deficit and Debt Facts
We first present some data on federal budget deficits and debt
because there is so much misinformation surrounding these
measures. Budget deficits add to the outstanding stock of federal
government debt. These data are often presented relative to the
size of GDP, helping to scale the nominal numbers and provide
some perspective. Unfortunately, this approach is often not pur-
sued by scaremongers who talk of “tens of trillions of dollars of
unfunded entitlements” when the baby boomers retire, since the
figure is meaningless unless it is compared to the sum of GDP
over the same period. 
Figure 1 shows federal government debt since 1943 in terms
of debt held by the public and gross debt. The scaremongers use
the (larger) gross debt number, which is highly misleading because
it includes the debt held in federal government accounts: debt
the government owes itself, including securities held in civil serv-
ice and military retirement funds, Social Security, Medicare, and
unemployment and highway trust funds.For example, the Social
Security program has run large budget surpluses since the early
1980s that are used to accumulate Treasury debt. The program
will sell the bonds back to the Treasury when revenues are less than
benefit payments.2 Really, this represents internal accounting, aLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
reminder that Social Security runs surpluses today but will run
deficits in the future. The relevant debt figure is the amount of
Treasuries held by the public.3
During World War II, the government’s deficit reached 25
percent of GDP and raised the publicly held debt ratio to more
than 100 percent—much higher than the 2015 forecast of 73 per-
cent. Further, in spite of warnings by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a),
U.S. economic growth in the postwar “golden age” was robust.
The debt ratio declined rather rapidly due to growth that raised
the denominator of the debt ratio rather than to budget sur-
pluses and debt retirement (although there were many small
annual surpluses, as discussed below). By contrast, slower eco-
nomic growth after 1973 was accompanied by budget deficits,
leading to slow growth of the debt ratio, until the economic
boom and budget surpluses during the Clinton years again low-
ered the ratio. 
When federal government debt is held by the public, the
government liability is exactly offset by nongovernment sector
assets, and interest payments by the government generate income
for the nongovernment sector. Even on the orthodox claim that
today’s deficits lead to debt that must be retired later, those future
higher taxes that are said to be required to service and pay off
tomorrow’s debt represent “redistribution” from taxpayers to
bondholders. This might be undesirable (perhaps bondholders
are wealthier than taxpayers), but the “redistribution” takes place
at the time the payment is made. While it is often claimed that
deficit spending today burdens our grandchildren, in reality we
leave them with government bonds that represent net financial
assets and wealth. If the decision is made to raise taxes and retire
the bonds in, say, 2050, the extra taxes are matched by payments
made directly to bondholders in 2050. (We deal with foreign
holdings of government bonds below.)
Although this decision to raise taxes in an effort to retire the
debt will burden taxpayers in 2050, it is not a necessary decision.
If taxes are not increased later, we simply leave future genera-
tions with Treasury debt that is a net asset in their portfolios, and
any payment of interest provides net income to bondholders.
Obviously, it will be up to future generations to decide whether
they should raise taxes by an amount equal to those interest pay-
ments, or by a greater amount in an attempt to retire the debt.
Even if we want to, we cannot put those burdens on future gen-
erations because we cannot dictate the fiscal stance to be taken in
2050. In short, our deficits today do not necessarily commit
future generations to raising taxes. 
Moreover, future generations would find that their attempts
to raise taxes (or slash spending) to achieve budget surpluses
would fail because the budgetary outcome is mostly “endoge-
nous” or nondiscretionary. Fiscal austerity slows the economy to
the point that tax revenues fall and spending on the social safety
net rises, thus preventing budget surpluses. In other words, even
if future generations decide to raise taxes and burden themselves,
they probably will not be able to retire the leftover Treasury debt
because their actions will not ensure a budget surplus large
enough to run down the debt. Recall President Clinton’s prom-
ise to run surpluses for 15 years in order to retire all the out-
standing debt—which failed because the fiscal drag caused a
recession that restored budget deficits. Thus, our grandkids
might as well enjoy the Treasuries as net wealth in their portfo-
lios and avoid the pain of higher taxes. 
That response—keeping the inherited debt—is what gener-
ations of Americans have done. There has been only one brief
period in U.S. history when a generation actually imposed suffi-
cient taxes to retire all the federal government debt: from 1835 to
1837, during Andrew Jackson’s second presidential term. All
other generations have adopted a much more prudent approach
by growing the economy and reducing the debt ratio rather than





Figure 1 Federal Government Debt, 1943–2009 
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The discussion so far has assumed that Treasury debt is held
domestically; however, much of the current hand-wringing
about deficits and debt concerns foreign ownership. Figure 2
shows foreign ownership of federal government debt as a per-
cent of all publicly held debt. The percent held by foreigners has
indeed been climbing—from less than 20 percent through the
mid-1990s to nearly 50 percent today. Most growth was by “offi-
cial” holders such as foreign treasuries or central banks, which
now account for more than a third of all publicly held federal
debt. This is supposed to represent ceding some measure of con-
trol of the U.S. government’s purse strings to foreign govern-
ments. Indeed, it is frequently claimed that China is responsible
for “financing” a huge portion of our federal government deficit,
and that if it suddenly stopped lending, the United States might
be unable to finance its budget deficits. 
The U.S. current account balance largely reflects the coun-
try’s trade deficit, fluctuating in the range of minus 0.5 to minus
3 percent of GDP in the 1980–99 period (Figure 2). After 1999,
the balance plummeted close to minus 6 percent of GDP before
turning around during the global economic downturn. However,
it remains close to minus 3 percent of GDP today. Note that the
rapid growth of foreign holdings of Treasuries coincided with
the rapid downturn of the current account balance—a point we
return to below. 
Financial sector holdings of Treasuries had been on a down-
ward trend until the current global crisis, when a run to liquid-
ity led financial institutions to increase purchases. Financial
sector holdings act like a buffer: when foreign demand is strong
(weak), U.S. financial institutions reduce (increase) their share.
In recent months the current account deficit has fallen dramat-
ically and reduced the flow of dollars abroad. Of course, new
Treasury issues have grown along with the rising budget deficit,
and the holdings of U.S. financial institution initially increased
in the run to liquidity during the crisis. Foreign official holdings
have also continued to climb, perhaps because the U.S. dollar is
still seen as a refuge and nations want to accumulate dollar
reserves to protect their currencies. This is the other side of the
liquidity-crisis coin. If there is fear of a run to liquidity, exchange
rates of countries thought to be riskier than the United States
face depreciation. It is rational for any country trying to peg its
currency to the dollar to increase its official holdings in response
to a global financial crisis.
Figure 3 shows the foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries. While
most public discussion has focused on China, Japanese holdings
have been comparable, and even surpassed those of China in
December 2009. As discussed above, there is a link between current
account deficits and foreign accumulation of U.S. Treasuries. From








Figure 2 Treasury Security Holdings, 1975–2009 (in percent 
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to accumulate dollar-denominated assets. In the first instance, a
trade surplus leads to dollar reserve credits (cash plus credits to
reserve accounts at the Fed). Since these credits earn a low rate of
interest (indeed, until recently, they earned no interest), they are
traded for U.S. Treasuries and other earning assets. Thus, it is not
surprising to find a link among U.S. trade deficits, foreign trade
surpluses, and foreign accumulation of U.S. Treasuries. 
While this is usually presented as foreign “lending” to
“finance” the U.S. budget deficit, one could just as well see the
U.S. current account deficit as the source of foreign current
account surpluses accumulated in the form of U.S. Treasuries.
Indeed, as discussed above, a trade surplus against the United
States allows a nation to accumulate dollar reserves at the Fed.
These can then be traded for U.S. Treasuries, an operation that is
equivalent to transferring funds from a “checking account”
(reserves) at the Fed to a “savings account” (Treasuries) at the
Fed. And when interest is “paid” on Treasuries, this is just a credit
of dollars to that “savings account.” In a sense, it is the willingness
of the United States to simultaneously run trade and government
budget deficits that provides other countries the wherewithal to
“finance” the accumulation of Treasuries. It is highly misleading
to view this as “lending” to the U.S. government—as if the dol-
lars spent by the federal government originate overseas.
Obviously, there must be willingness on all sides for this to
occur, and most public discussion ignores the fact that China’s
eagerness to run a trade surplus with the United States is linked to
its hunger for dollar assets. At the same time, the U.S. budget deficit
helps to generate domestic income that allows private consump-
tion—by fueling imports and providing income for foreigners to
accumulate dollar savings, even while generating Treasuries that
are accumulated by foreigners. In other words, these are not inde-
pendent decisions. It makes no sense to talk of China “lending”
dollars to the United States without also taking into account
China’s desire for net exports. Indeed, the following matters are all
linked (possibly in complex ways): the willingness of China to pro-
duce for export and to accumulate dollar-denominated assets, the
shortfall of Chinese domestic demand that allows the country to
run a trade surplus, the willingness of Americans to buy foreign
products, the high level of U.S. aggregate demand that results in a
trade deficit, and the factors behind a U.S. government budget
deficit. And, of course, it is even more complicated than this, since
other nations, as well as global demand, are also involved. 
While there are claims that China might suddenly decide
against further accumulations of U.S. Treasuries, it is likely that
many other relationships would also need to change to enable
that to happen. For example, China might choose to accumulate
euros, but there is no equivalent to the U.S. Treasury in Euroland.
China could accumulate the euro-denominated debt of individ-
ual governments—say, Greece—but this debt has different risk
ratings and insufficient volume to satisfy China. Further,
Euroland taken as a whole (especially Germany, its strongest
member) constrains domestic demand in order to run trade sur-
pluses. In other words, Euroland does not represent a huge net
demand for global exports. If the United States is a primary mar-
ket for China’s excess output but euro assets are preferred over
dollar assets, then exchange rate adjustment between the dollar
and the euro could destroy China’s market. Hence, it is not likely
that China would continue to export to the United States but
would accumulate euro assets rather than dollars.
We are not arguing that the current situation will go on for-
ever, although we do believe it will persist much longer than pre-
sumed by most commentators. We are instead pointing out that
changes are complex, and that there are strong incentives against
the sort of simple, abrupt, and dramatic shifts posited as likely sce-
narios. We expect that the complex linkages between balance sheets
and actions will ensure that transitions are moderate and slow.
The final topic to be addressed in this section concerns inter-
est rates (yields) and the price of Treasuries. Figure 4 shows
(daily) yields on Treasuries of different maturities. Fearing infla-
tion and possibly attempting to quell the real estate bubble, the
Fed began to raise interest rates in 2004. Note that lending in the
Fed funds market or purchasing federal government debt of
shortest maturity represents nearly perfect substitutes from the
point of view of banks. Hence, raising the Fed funds target leads
to an immediate and nearly equivalent increase in yield for the
shortest maturity. Determining other rates is more complex, as
shorter maturities track the Fed funds rate more closely, while
longer maturities may not move in tandem with the target rate.
What we see in Figure 4 is a shocking convergence of yields
across the maturity structure when the Fed pushed overnight
interest rates toward 5 percent. If the Fed really was trying to
increase mortgage and other longer-term rates, the market com-
pletely defeated its effort. When the Fed tightened, the 10-year
bond rate, which usually tracks 30-year fixed mortgage rates
fairly well, moved only 100 basis points. While many have
blamed the Fed for the real estate bubble because it supposedly
kept rates too low, the figure shows that the Fed raised short-
term interest rates sharply but their action did not result inPublic Policy Brief, No. 111 8
higher long-term rates. When the crisis hit, the Fed quickly low-
ered short-term interest rates, but long-term rates refused to
decline by much. This reflects the “run to liquidity” that is a fea-
ture of all financial crises. (Long-term rates finally did begin to
decline at the beginning of 2009, before turning upward once
again.) Even as short-term rates approached the lower bound of
zero, long-term rates remained high, resulting in wide spreads. 
Figure 5 shows a longer time frame, with the spread between
one-month T-bills and long-maturity bonds widening to approx-
imately 400 basis points in 1993, mid-2003, and today. Also
shown in this figure is government debt in terms of both gross
and public Treasury debt as a percent of GDP. There is some ten-
dency for spreads to widen when the outstanding debt stock is
growing relative to GDP. To be sure, the correlation is not tight,
but it is suggestive. It certainly appears that the decision in early
2006 to reissue 30-year debt might have been a mistake, since
recent issues of longer-term debt have been met by stubbornly
high yields. (In a later section we discuss how the Treasury can
easily avoid pressuring longer-term rates by always sticking to
short-term maturities.) 
How Sustainable Are Budget Deficits?
President Obama has warned that projected budget deficits could
leave our grandchildren with a “mountain of debt” unless we
bring the budget under control. Gregory Mankiw (2010), who
reflects the deficit-dove position, argues that, while “a budget
deficit, even a large one, is called for” at times, the trouble is that
Obama’s budget “fails to return the federal government to man-
ageable budget deficits, even as the wars wind down and the
economy recovers from the recession.” He goes on to argue that
“the president seems to understand that the fiscal plan presented
in his budget is not sustainable,” which is why Obama has created
a commission to come up with a way to “stabilize the debt-to-
GDP ratio at an acceptable level once the economy recovers.” 
Catherine Rampell (2010) goes further, arguing that current
incentives lead myopic politicians to “see fiscal profligacy as a
prerequisite for re-election,” and that only by properly aligning
“the interests of the country with those of the politicians who
Figure 4 Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, 2004–10 
(in percent)   









































































Figure 5 Market Yield on Treasury Securities and Federal 
Debt, 1990–2009   
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are guiding it” can we put some spine into budgeting. A com-
mission will not be enough: Congress has imposed various rules
on itself, such as pay-go, Gramm-Rudman, and the Byrd Rule,
and none were able to prevent unsustainable deficits. Hence,
Rampell proposes to “delegate fiscal policy—that is, taxing and
spending—to a separate technocratic body, which can rely on
legal authority rather than popularity.” The Fed might serve as a
model—a depoliticized, independent body not subject to dem-
ocratic pressures. Or, perhaps even better, says Rampell, directly
change the incentives of politicians so that they would be “barred
from running for re-election, and even thrown in jail” if they
“overspend.” 
Obviously, all such critiques are based on the supposition
that projected future deficits—if not those we already have
today—are too large to be sustained. Various indicators have
been proposed: the debt-to-GDP ratio (Reinhart and Rogoff sug-
gest a limit below 90 percent, while the Maastricht criteria
impose 60 percent) or ensuring that the government debt serv-
ice does not grow faster than GDP. 
We can identify three financial positions related to borrow-
ing by households or firms—what Hyman P. Minsky called
hedge, speculative, and Ponzi. A hedge position can cover inter-
est and principal payments out of income flows. A speculative
position can cover interest payments only, so the principal is
rolled over. A Ponzi position must “capitalize” interest, meaning
that the unit must borrow just to pay interest. Some want to
extend such a classification to government. If we define govern-
ment “income” as tax revenue, then a speculative position would
be one in which tax revenue covers all current spending, includ-
ing interest payments, but debt cannot be retired—the defini-
tion of a balanced budget. However, new debt could be issued
each year, so long as additional interest payments plus additional
government spending increase only as fast as government tax
revenue “income.” In this way, government could use its capital
account to issue debt and “pay for” investment-type spending. 
This is a common “deficit-dove” proposal, whereby govern-
ment acts like a firm by keeping a separate capital account. Here,
the “sustainability” condition would depend on the relation
between the interest rate paid and the growth rate of tax revenue
and other spending but would allow the government debt to
grow at the growth rate of GDP. Conceivably, the debt-to-GDP
ratio could even rise for some time if taxes grew faster than GDP
(although taxes would eventually reach 100 percent of GDP—
not a sustainable trend). For an infinitely-lived economic unit, a
speculative position would appear to be safe, although rising
interest rates or a fall in tax revenues and increased spending on
the social safety net in a recession could turn a speculative posi-
tion into a Ponzi position by producing large deficits. As Mankiw
warns, current budget projections show a rising debt-to-GDP
ratio and perhaps unrealistically optimistic forecasts of economic
growth. Further, should the economy begin to recover, it is
almost certain that the Fed would begin to raise interest rates—
increasing federal spending on interest. Hence, it looks like Ponzi
finance is a likely outcome of the current fiscal stance. In that case,
government would “borrow” in order to finance at least some of
its interest payments, and would be unable to repay its debt.
In the next section we examine whether it is appropriate to
apply such classifications to a sovereign government. In short, is
there anything wrong with “Ponzi finance” by the U.S. govern-
ment? We will conclude that these classifications of financial
positions do not apply to the sovereign issuer of the currency. In
short, we argue that government is not like a household or firm.
Is a Government Like a Household or a Firm?
Discussion of government budget deficits often begins with an
analogy to household budgets: “no household can continually
spend more than its income, and neither can the federal govern-
ment.” On the surface that might appear sensible; dig deeper, and
it makes no sense at all. A sovereign government bears no obvi-
ous resemblance to a household or a firm. 
First of all, the U.S. federal government is 221 years old, if we
date its birth to the adoption of the Constitution. Arguably, that
is about as good a date as we can find, since the Constitution
established a common market in the United States, forbade states
from interfering with interstate trade (for example, through tax-
ation), gave the federal government the power to levy and collect
taxes, and reserved the power to create money, regulate its value,
and fix standards of weight and measurement—from whence
our money of account, the dollar, comes from—for the federal
government. 
No head of household has such a long lifespan. This might
appear irrelevant, but it is not. When you die, your debts and
assets need to be assumed and resolved. Firms can be long lived,
but when they go out of business or are acquired, their debts are
also assumed or resolved. However, there is no “day of reckoning”
or final piper-paying date for the sovereign government. True, not
all governments last forever, and sometimes new governmentsPublic Policy Brief, No. 111 10
will choose to honor the debts of “deceased” governments. But
honoring debts is a choice, since a sovereign government is, well,
sovereign. 
Note also that in spite of all the analogies drawn between
governments and households, and in concert with the statement
that debts cannot be allowed to grow forever, corporations that
are going concerns can and do allow their outstanding debt to
grow year-over-year, with no final retirement of debt unless the
firm goes out of business. In other words, long-lived firms do
indeed spend more than their incomes on a continuous basis.
The key, of course, is that they attempt to balance their current
account and keep a separate capital account. So long as firms can
service their debt, the debt can always be rolled over rather than
retired. This is why some deficit doves advocate capital accounts
for government. We will make a stronger argument: even the 
infinitely-lived corporation is financially constrained, while the
sovereign, currency-issuing government is not subject to the
same constraints.
Second—and far more important—households and firms
do not have the power to levy taxes, issue currency, or demand
that taxes be paid in the currency they issue. Rather, households
and firms are users of the currency issued by a sovereign gov-
ernment. Both households and firms do issue liabilities, and
some of these liabilities can to varying degrees fulfill some func-
tions of “money.” For example, banks issue demand deposits,
which are the banks’ liability that can be used by households or
firms as a medium of exchange, a means of debt retirement, or
a store of value. However, all of these private “money things”
(bank deposits or other private IOUs) are denominated in dol-
lars, and only the sovereign government of the United States has
the constitutionally provided right to fix standards of weight and
measurement—that is, to name the dollar money of account. 
There is no need to interpret this too narrowly. It is clear
that U.S. residents can voluntarily choose to use foreign curren-
cies or even idiosyncratic measures of worth in transactions
(local currency units such as the Berkshares in the Northeast).
But when all is said and done, the ability of the U.S. government
to impose dollar taxes and other obligations (e.g., fees and fines),
and to require that those taxes and obligations be paid in dol-
lars, gives priority to the use of dollars (and to the denomina-
tion of most transactions and obligations in dollars) within its
sovereign territories that no other currency enjoys. 
Third, with one brief exception the federal government has
been in debt every year since 1776. For the first and only time in
U.S. history, the public debt was retired in January 1835 and a
budget surplus maintained for the next two years, in order to accu-
mulate what President Jackson’s Treasury secretary, Levi
Woodbury, called “a fund to meet future deficits.” In 1837, the
economy collapsed into a deep depression and drove the budget
into deficit, and the federal government has been in debt ever since. 
There have been seven periods of substantial budget sur-
pluses and debt reductions since 1776. The national debt fell by
29 percent from 1817 to 1821, and was eliminated in 1835 (under
President Jackson); it fell by 59 percent from 1852 to 1857, by 27
percent from 1867 to 1873, by more than 50 percent from 1880
to 1893, and by about a third from 1920 to 1930. Of course, the
last time we ran a budget surplus was during President Clinton’s
second term. 
Has any household been able to run budget deficits for
approximately 190 out of the past 230-odd years and accumulate
debt virtually nonstop since 1837? As discussed above, there are
firms that grow their debt year-over-year, so it is conceivable that
one might have a record of “profligate” spending to match that
of the federal government. Still, the claim might be that firms go
into debt to increase productive capacity and thus profitability,
while government spending is largely “consumption.” This seems
to be why the analogy is usually made between government and
household budgets. But even if it is true that households do not
run persistent budget deficits for years on end, it is empirically
true that the U.S. government does.
Fourth, the United States has also experienced six periods
of depression that began in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, and
1929. Comparing these dates with the periods of budget sur-
pluses, one finds that every significant reduction of the out-
standing debt, with the exception of the Clinton surpluses, has
been followed by a depression, and that every depression has
been preceded by significant debt reduction. The Clinton sur-
pluses were followed by the Bush recession that was ended by a
speculative, private debt–fueled euphoria, and was followed in
turn by our current economic collapse. The jury is still out on
whether we might yet suffer another Great Depression. While we
cannot rule out coincidences, seven periods of surplus followed
by six and a half depressions (with some possibility for making
it a perfect seven) should raise eyebrows. And, as we show below,
our less serious downturns in the postwar period have almost
always been preceded by reductions of federal budget deficits.
This brings us to an obvious point: the federal government is big,
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the economy, which is the subject of the next section. As we will
discuss, the government’s budget plays an important balancing
role in the economy—filling demand gaps that allow the non-
government sectors to achieve the surplus that they normally
desire. For this reason, trying to operate the federal government’s
budget as if it were a household that normally wants to save has
a disastrous impact on the economy. 
Finally, the most important point is that the U.S. federal
government is the sole issuer of the dollar, which is always
accepted in payment. Government actually spends by crediting
bank deposits (and simultaneously crediting the reserves of
banks); as such, it can never run out of dollars. These topics are
explored in detail below. But the point is that no household (or
firm) is able to spend by crediting bank deposits and reserves or by
issuing currency. Households and firms can spend by going into
debt, but the debt must be serviced with another debt—usually a
bank debt. A sovereign government makes payments (including
interest payments on its debt) by issuing its own nonconvertible
IOU. This is why we ultimately conclude that the notion of
“Ponzi finance” does not apply to government because, unlike
private debtors, it can always service its debt by crediting
accounts. This is a key to understanding why perpetual budget
deficits are “sustainable” in the conventional sense of that term.
We realize that distinguishing between a sovereign govern-
ment and a household does not put to rest all deficit fears. But
since this analogy is invoked so often, it is useful to lay out some
of the important differences. When someone claims that gov-
ernment budget deficits are unsustainable and that the govern-
ment must eventually pay back all of that debt, ask him why the
U.S. government has managed to avoid retiring debt since
1837—is 173 years long enough to establish a “sustainable” pat-
tern? Ask whether we might be able to go another 173 years with-
out the government going “bankrupt,” even though it would run
deficits in most years. We do admit that historical analysis is not
sufficient, since the United States today is not like the country it
was in 1837. However, for reasons we will discuss, the fiscal sit-
uation faced by the U.S. government is far more favorable now
than it was between 1873 and the early 1970s, when the United
States was usually operating with a convertible currency.
In the next two sections we present an alternative view of
budget deficits and then compare a sovereign country like the
United States with a country operating with a nonsovereign cur-
rency, like Greece on the euro or Argentina under the currency
board. We conclude that the situation faced by the United States
today is indeed different from that when the nation was founded,
and in all succeeding years up to the collapse of Bretton Woods
in 1973. The changes that year actually removed any question of
the sustainability of federal budget deficits. Once the United
States eliminated the last vestiges of the gold standard, govern-
ment finance entered a completely new paradigm.
How a Sovereign Government Really Spends
Governments worldwide have inflicted so many self-imposed
constraints on public spending that it has become really hard to
see the truth behind public spending. Naturally, we tend to think
that a balanced budget for a household or government is a good
thing, but we fail to make the distinction between a currency
issuer and a currency user—between a sovereign and a nonsov-
ereign country (in the monetary sense). A country that pegs its
currency exchange rate to another currency (or metal) doesn’t
have monetary sovereignty as we define it, since its domestic pol-
icy space is constrained by the necessity to maintain the peg.
What we define as a sovereign currency is one that is not pegged,
meaning the government does not promise to exchange its cur-
rency at a fixed exchange rate. In that sense, a sovereign currency
is not convertible. The United States, like many other developed
and developing countries, has been operating on a sovereign
monetary system ever since it went off the gold peg in 1973. 
The key insight is that if a government issues a currency that
is not backed by any metal or pegged to another currency, then
it cannot be constrained in its ability to “finance” spending
because it doesn’t need tax and bond revenues in order to spend.
Indeed, we argue that modern sovereign governments spend by
crediting bank accounts—they do not really spend tax revenue,
nor do they borrow by selling bonds. Rather, taxes result in deb-
its of bank accounts. Budget deficits lead to net credits to bank
accounts and budget surpluses lead to net debits. At the macro-
economic level, government spending increases private dispos-
able income while taxes reduce spending. A deficit occurs when
the government adds more to private disposable income than it
taxes away. A government surplus (deficit) has to equal the non-
government sector’s deficit (surplus).
Government normally sells Treasuries more or less equal in
volume to its budget deficit, for reasons explained below. As
already stated, budget deficits generate nongovernment surpluses
or saving because government spending in excess of taxes creates
nongovernment income. When the Treasury sells bonds, some ofPublic Policy Brief, No. 111 12
the income created by its deficits is devoted to saving in the form of
government bonds. Otherwise, this saving can be held in the form
of noninterest-earning cash or bank deposits. When the value of
Treasury checks to the private sector is greater than the value of pri-
vate sector checks that pay taxes, the private sector receives net
income and accumulates wealth—in the form of Treasuries. 
Private banks, in turn, accumulate Treasuries, plus reserves
at the Fed in an amount equal to the government’s deficit (less
any cash withdrawn). We can think of reserves at the Fed as the
equivalent of bank “checking deposits”—used by banks for clear-
ing (with one another and with the Fed). Treasuries can be
thought of as bank “saving deposits” held at the Fed, earning
interest. When a bank buys a Treasury bond, the Fed debits 
the bank’s “checking account” (reserves) and credits the bank’s
“saving account” (Treasuries). The Fed credits interest to bank
“saving accounts” (Treasuries)—it now also credits bank “check-
ing accounts” with interest because the Fed started paying (low)
interest on reserves last year.
When the Treasury spends by sending a check to the private
sector, the check is deposited in a bank. (Increasingly, deposits
are made directly by wire transfer.) The Fed then credits the
bank’s reserve account and debits the Treasury’s account at the
Fed. The opposite procedure happens when the public pays taxes:
the Treasury’s account at the Fed is credited and the bank’s
reserve account is debited, along with the taxpayer’s deposit. 
In case the public decides it doesn’t want bank deposits and
would rather have cash, households and firms withdraw currency
from their bank accounts, and bank reserves decrease by an equal
amount. The same happens when the public prefers to keep its
wealth in the form of government bonds. The sale of Treasuries
to the public results in a debit in the banks’ reserve account as
bond buyers write checks against their bank accounts, and the
Fed debits the reserve accounts of banks and credits the
Treasury’s account at the Fed. 
Every time the Treasury spends, bank reserves are credited,
as long as the nonbank sector does not withdraw cash from its
accounts. If banks already have the quantity of desired reserves
(which would be the normal case), Treasury spending creates
excess reserves in the system. Banks offer excess reserves in the
overnight Fed funds market. Of course, all this can do is to shift
the excess reserves from one bank to another, since reserves will
not leave the banking system except through cash withdrawals.
Finding no takers for the reserves, this will place downward pres-
sure on the Fed funds rate, unless the Fed intervenes. 
In order to provide a substitute for the excess reserves and hit
its target rate, the Fed sells Treasuries to the private sector, thereby
transforming the wealth held in the form of bank deposits and
reserves into Treasury securities. Bank reserves are debited by the
amount of Treasuries sold (whether banks or their customers buy
them). In essence, this is a substitution of lower-earning excess
reserves (“checking accounts” at the Fed) for higher-earning
Treasuries (“saving accounts” at the Fed), and it is done to accom-
modate the demand for Treasuries as indicated by a falling
overnight Fed funds rate (because banks do not want to hold the
existing quantity of reserves). In other words, sales of Treasuries
should be thought of as a monetary policy operation that accom-
modates portfolio preferences of banks and their customers—
much as banks will accommodate a desire by individuals to switch
funds from their checking accounts to their saving accounts.
To recap, a government deficit generates a net injection of
disposable income into the private sector that increases saving
and wealth, which can be held either in the form of government
liabilities (cash or Treasuries) or noninterest-earning bank lia-
bilities (bank deposits). If the nonbank public prefers bank
deposits, then banks will hold an equivalent quantity of reserves,
cash, and Treasuries (government IOUs), distributed according
to bank preferences.
A government budget surplus has exactly the opposite effect
on private sector income and wealth: it’s a net leakage of dispos-
able income from the nongovernment sector that reduces net
saving and wealth by the same amount. When the government
takes more from the public in taxes than it gives in spending, it
initially results in a net debit of bank reserves and a reduction in
outstanding cash balances. If banks had previously held the
desired amount of reserves and cash (which would be the normal
case, since otherwise there would have been pressure on the
overnight rates), a budget surplus would result in a shortfall of
reserves and vault cash. Banks could go to the Fed funds market
to obtain reserves, but in this scenario there is a system shortage
that cannot be met by interbank lending. As a result, a shortage
of cash and reserve balances forces the private sector to sell
Treasuries to the Fed in order to obtain the desired reserves. The
Fed then adds reserves to the bank “checking deposits” and debits
bank “saving deposits,” simultaneously reducing the Treasury’s
deposit at the Fed and retiring the Treasuries. This retirement of
government debt takes place pari pasu with government surpluses. Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
The Three Balances and the Impact of 
Government Surpluses
The most recent period of federal government surpluses was the
(highly extolled) Clinton surpluses from the first quarter of 1998
through the second quarter of 2001. For reasons that should now
be clear, these surpluses destroyed nongovernment sector income
and wealth, forcing households to borrow in order to maintain
living standards. Since the United States ran current account
deficits over that period, it was necessary for the (domestic) non-
government sector to run even larger deficits to match the gov-
ernment’s surplus, plus the foreign sector current account deficit.4
Household borrowing accelerated in the decade following
the surpluses of 1998, increasing from 67 percent to 97 percent
of GDP by 2007. By contrast, household debt increased from just
40 percent to 65 percent of GDP over the entire 1960–97 period.
The story wouldn’t be complete without predatory lenders, who
were eager to extend credit to everyone, regardless of the ability
to repay; and deregulation, which freed the lenders’ hands (top-
ics beyond the scope of this brief). 
Based on the work of Distinguished Scholar Wynne Godley,
it is useful to divide the macroeconomy according to its three
main sectors: domestic government, domestic nongovernment
(or private), and the foreign sector. According to his aggregate
accounting identity, the deficits and surpluses across these three
sectors must sum to zero; that is, one sector can run a deficit so
long as at least one other sector runs a surplus. Figure 6 shows the
three main balances of the United States. When there is a gov-
ernment sector surplus as well as a current account deficit (the
“twin leakages” during the Clinton boom), the private sector is
left with two possibilities to counteract the destruction of
income: it can stop importing (leading to a balanced current
account) or it can spend more (running a private sector deficit).
For most households, borrowing substituted for the income
squeezed by tight fiscal policies. This is why the federal budget
surpluses under Clinton did not (immediately) lead to an eco-
nomic downturn, since private sector deficits maintained aggre-
gate demand but increased indebtedness. 
As evidenced by the current crisis, private sector borrowing
on the scale seen after 1997 is not sustainable. The Clinton sur-
pluses would inevitably result in a downturn, just like every sus-
tained budget surplus in U.S. history. Figure 7 shows the federal
government balance as a percent of GDP (deficit or surplus) and
periods of recession. (The sign of the government balance is
reversed, so that a budget surplus is shown as a negative number.)
Every recession since World War II was preceded by a govern-
ment surplus or a declining deficit-to-GDP ratio, including the
recession following the Clinton surpluses. Recovery from that
recession resulted from renewed domestic private sector deficits,
although growth was also fueled by government budget deficits
that grew to 4 percent of GDP. However, as shown below, the
Bush recovery caused tax revenues to grow so fast that the budget
deficit fell through 2007, setting up the conditions for yet
another economic collapse. 
Figure 7 Federal Government Balance and Recessions, 
1947–2008Q3 (in percent of GDP)   
Notes: The sign of the government balance is reversed. Shaded areas indicate 
recession.

















































































































































Figure 6 U.S. Main Sector Balances and Real GDP Growth, 
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Just as surpluses precede recessions, large (nondiscretionary)
budget deficits almost always result from recessions because of
automatic stabilizers. When the economy slides into recession,
tax revenues fall as economic activity declines. Social transfer
payments, particularly unemployment benefits, increase auto-
matically as more people lose their jobs. Despite all the conser-
vative uproar against Obama’s stimulus plan, the largest portion
of the deficit increase to date has come from automatic stabiliz-
ers rather than from discretionary spending. This is observable
in Figure 8, which shows the growth rate of tax revenues (mostly
automatic, moving with the cycle because income and payroll
taxes depend on economic performance), government con-
sumption expenditures (somewhat discretionary), and transfer
payments (largely automatic) relative to that in the same quar-
ter a year earlier.
In 2005, tax revenues were growing at an accelerated rate of 
15 percent per year—far above the GDP growth rate (hence, reduc-
ing nongovernment sector income) and above the government
spending growth rate (5 percent). As shown in Figure 8, this fiscal
tightening was followed by a downturn—which automatically
slowed growth of tax revenue. While government consumption
expenditures remained relatively stable during the downturn (after
a short spike in 2007–08), the tax revenue growth rate dropped
sharply from 5 percent to negative 10 percent within just three
quarters (from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter
of 2008), and to negative 15 percent by the first quarter of 2009.
Transfer payments have been growing at an average quarterly
rate of 10 percent (relative to the same quarter the previous year)
since 2007. Decreasing taxes, coupled with increasing transfer
payments, have automatically pushed the budget into a larger
deficit, notwithstanding the flat consumption expenditures. 
These automatic stabilizers, not the bailouts or stimulus
package, are the reason why the U.S. economy has not been in a
free fall comparable to that of the Great Depression. When the
economy slowed, the budget automatically went into a deficit,
placing a floor under aggregate demand. And in spite of all the
calls to rein in deficits, the truth is that deficits will not come
down until the economy begins to recover. Even if we eliminated
welfare payments, Medicaid, Medicare, military spending, ear-
marks, Social Security payments, and all programs except for
entitlements; and also stopped the stimulus injections, shut
down the education department, and doubled corporate taxes,
the New York Times estimates that the budget deficit would still
be over $400 billion. This example further demonstrates the
nondiscretionary nature of the budget deficit. And, of course,
this example doesn’t consider how much more tax revenues
would fall and transfer payments would rise if these cuts were
actually undertaken. With the current automatic stabilizers in
place, the budget cannot be balanced, and attempts to do so will
only damage the real economy as incomes and employment fall. 
To summarize, fiscal policy should focus on results rather
than follow conventional/ceremonial ideas about what is sound
and what is not. A sovereign government spends by crediting bank
accounts, while taxation debits them. Rather than “paying for”
government spending, the real macroeconomic purpose of taxes is
to keep private income and spending at a noninflationary level.
Clearly, in current circumstances, it would be a big mistake to raise
taxes now—when the danger is unemployment and deflation. 
Government Budgets and Self-imposed Constraints
Guided by flawed economic thinking, governments worldwide
have imposed constraints on their fiscal capacity to fully utilize
their labor resources. Examples of self-imposed constraints
include issuing bonds before government can spend, erecting
barriers between fiscal and monetary authorities (and giving the
Figure 8 Federal Government Tax Receipts, Consumption 
Expenditures, and Transfer Payments,* 2005Q1–2009Q4 
(in percent)      
*Growth rate relative to the same quarter of the previous year
Note: Tax receipts data unavailable for 2009Q4
Sources: BEA; authors’ calculations
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latter more “independence”), and setting debt ceilings, deficit
limits, and so on. A sovereign government doesn’t need to sell
bonds in order to spend because it can simply tell its central bank
to credit its account by as much as it needs prior to writing
checks on that account. Alternatively (and much more sensibly),
the central bank and treasury can be consolidated so that the
treasury can credit bank accounts along with its spending. 
Even though governments have adopted a variety of self-
imposed constraints, they are not normally binding. For exam-
ple, the prohibition on the sale of treasury bonds directly to the
central bank is easily circumvented. When the U.S. Treasury does
not have sufficient funds in its checking deposit at the Fed, it sells
bonds to special depositories (private banks) that are allowed to
buy the bonds by crediting the Treasury’s checking deposit held
temporarily in private banks. The Treasury then transfers its
deposit to the Fed before spending (it can only write checks on
deposits at the Fed). This would normally result in a reserve debit
from the bank accounts, but the Fed allows a “float” to postpone
the debit because Treasury spending will restore the reserves. The
final result is that the banks hold Treasuries and the customers
have demand deposits. If the banks prefer to hold reserves, the
Fed engages in an open market purchase—buying bonds and
crediting bank reserves (as discussed above, this is equivalent to
moving funds from bank “saving accounts” to “checking
accounts” at the Fed). The net effect is exactly the same as if the
Fed had bought the bonds directly from the Treasury. 
As another example, the Treasury must get the approval of
Congress to expand its “borrowing limit” when it approaches its
debt ceiling. After members of Congress dutifully wring their hands
and declaim the burden placed on future generations by the admin-
istration, the debt limit is increased. In any case, bond sales are a
completely voluntary and self-imposed operation for a sovereign
government. As discussed, bonds are merely an interest-earning
“savings account” alternative to a low-earning reserve “checking
account,” and they are used by the Fed to hit its interest rate tar-
get. A central bank can simply pay interest on reserves (as
Canada has done for a long time and the Fed is now doing) and
the government can dispense entirely with selling bonds and
worrying about debt ceilings. The Fed would then act as the
Treasury’s bank by taking a Treasury IOU and crediting Treasury’s
account when it wanted to spend. When the Treasury spent, the
Fed would credit private banks with reserves and the banks
would credit their customers’ bank deposits. Taxes would reverse
this procedure. 
Under this procedure, budget deficits would generate reserve
growth (bank deposits at the Fed that are the Fed’s liability) that
is offset by growth of the Treasury’s liability to the Fed (the Fed’s
asset). Congress (or the Fed) could set the interest rate on the
Treasury’s liabilities held by the Fed that are used for accounting
purposes. Since Fed earnings above a 6 percent return go directly
to the Treasury, the Treasury in effect would pay most of the
interest to itself. The rest would go to the Fed to help cover the
costs of paying interest on reserves at the overnight rate chosen
by the Fed (and distributing profits to its shareholding member
banks). This would greatly simplify procedures, make the oper-
ations more transparent, and allow everyone to stop worrying
about federal government debt. Since reserves are not counted as
debt, there would be no publicly held debt. It should be recog-
nized that Treasury IOUs held by the Fed simply represent inter-
nal accounting—the government owing itself and paying interest
to itself. Any interest paid out by the Fed to banks holding
reserves should be booked as government expenditure; that is, a
subsidy to the banking system. 
The rate paid today on reserves (and on short-term govern-
ment bills) is a discretionary-policy variable. One of the huge
fears about budget deficits is that the government might find that
it would have to pay ruinous interest rates one day to get anyone
to hold its debt. Let’s presume that the federal government fol-
lowed the proposal laid out in the previous paragraphs but the
Fed decided to pay zero interest on reserves. With Treasury
spending, the bank accounts of recipients would be credited with
deposits and the banks’ accounts at the Fed would be credited
with nonearning reserves. Presumably, the banks would not want
to hold any excess reserves (reserves above the amount required
by the Fed or needed for clearing). They would offer reserves in
the overnight Fed funds market, driving the rate to zero. Since
the Fed would be paying zero on reserves, the “market equilib-
rium” rate would be zero. And try as they might, banks in the
aggregate cannot get rid of reserves, since only tax payments or
cash withdrawals reduce reserve holdings. 
Would the banks refuse to allow their customers to receive
deposits from the Treasury? No, since that would cause them to
lose customers. It is possible that banks would begin to impose
fees on deposit accounts to cover some of the costs of offering
transaction accounts, while holding (nonearning) reserves in
their portfolios. If that is not a desired outcome, the government
could subsidize the private payments system by paying a posi-
tive interest rate on reserves—as discussed above, this simplyPublic Policy Brief, No. 111 16
means that the Fed credits bank “checking accounts,” much as
banks pay interest by crediting customers’ checking accounts.
Let‘s return to the current system, in which the federal gov-
ernment issues bonds and the Fed pays a low interest rate on
reserves. As discussed, deficit spending by the Treasury results in
net credits to banking system reserves. If excess reserves are gen-
erated, banks offer them in the overnight market, which pushes
the Fed funds rate down to the “support rate”—the rate paid on
reserves. If the Fed prefers to maintain a higher Fed funds rate,
it can engage in an open market sale of Treasuries and substitute
them for reserves. This is how it maintains the Fed funds market
rate at its target overnight rate—a spread above the rate it pays
on reserves. If the Treasury only issues short-term bills, its inter-
est rate will be determined by substitution in the overnight lend-
ing market. In other words, the rate on Treasury debt will be set
relative to the Fed’s overnight target rate. This result holds no
matter how big the deficit or how much government debt is
issued, so long as its maturity is short enough to be a close sub-
stitute for overnight interbank lending. 
This means that the government doesn’t need to allow the
markets to determine the interest rate it pays on its debt. And
even if the Treasury chose to issue longer-term bonds, the Fed
could actually set interest rates of different maturities if it were
willing to deal in bonds of different maturities. Effectively, gov-
ernment could offer the equivalent of a range of “certificates of
deposit” with different maturities and interest rates—exactly
what banks do with their certificates of deposit. If the govern-
ment offered, say, 4 percent on “deposits” of 30 years but found
no takers, that would be perfectly fine. It could either adjust the
30-year rate to try to find buyers—or, better, simply let buyers
choose shorter maturities at lower rates. 
This leads us back to the concern about foreign holders of
debt. Foreign sellers of goods, services, or assets to the United
States receive dollar credits, usually to a foreign branch of a U.S.
bank or to a correspondent bank that receives a credit to its
reserve account (or to the reserve account of a “mother” bank).
If this bank preferred domestic currency reserves, the dollar
reserves would end up in the account of its central bank. In any
case, the holder of dollar reserves will probably try to find a
higher interest rate—offering reserves in the overnight market
or buying U.S. Treasuries. All of the analysis presented previously
applies here, but with one wrinkle: the foreign holder could
decide to exchange the dollar reserves for other currencies. Of
course, the exchange cannot occur unless there is someone with
the desired currency who is willing to exchange another currency
for dollars. It is conceivable that, as portfolios of currency
reserves were adjusted, exchange rates would adjust with the U.S.
current account deficit placing downward pressure on the dollar. 
While the conventional wisdom is that the Fed could keep
the dollar from depreciating by raising domestic interest rates,
there is plenty of empirical evidence to doubt the efficacy of
interest rate adjustments impacting exchange rates. As argued
above, the decision to sell products to the United States is not
independent of the decision to accumulate foreign currency. We
are skeptical that the interest rate paid on foreign currency
reserves is as important as the decision to export or accumulate
foreign currency. As discussed above, we see the U.S. current
account deficit as the flip side of the coin to foreign desire to
accumulate dollar assets. In the first instance, these claims take
the form of reserves at the Fed. Holders will naturally try to earn
the maximum return consistent with their appetite for risk, and
hence prefer U.S. Treasuries that pay more than reserve deposits
at the Fed. But they will take what they can get.
In conclusion, there is no financial constraint on the ability
of a sovereign nation to deficit spend. This doesn’t mean that
there are no real resource constraints on government spending,
but these constraints, not financial constraints, should be the real
concern. If government spending pushes the economy beyond
full capacity, then there is inflation. Inflation can also result
before full employment if there are bottlenecks or if firms have
monopoly pricing power. Government spending can also
increase current account deficits, especially if the marginal
propensity to import is high. This could affect exchange rates,
which could generate pass-through inflation. 
The alternative would be to use fiscal austerity and try to
keep the economy sufficiently depressed in order to eliminate
the pressure on prices or exchange rates. While we believe that
this would be a mistake—the economic losses due to operating
below full employment are almost certainly much higher than
the losses due to inflation or currency depreciation—it is an
entirely separate matter from financial constraints or insolvency,
which are problems sovereign governments do not face.
However, as discussed in the next section, nonsovereign govern-
ments do face financial constraints and can be pushed into invol-
untary default.Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
Countries with Nonsovereign Monetary Systems
Recently, all eyes have been on Greece, which has been harshly
criticized for fiscal irresponsibility—not to mention cooking its
books and masking its debt and deficit levels with the help of
Goldman Sachs. With an estimated budget deficit of around 13
percent of GDP (more than quadruple the Maastricht criterion)
and debt of 120 percent of GDP, Greek bonds have been down-
graded by rating agencies. Even with already high interest rates
on its debt, Greece is having a hard time finding investors will-
ing to buy its bonds, and has asked the International Monetary
Fund and European Union members to help by providing fund-
ing. While a bailout package is imminent, it comes with crush-
ing fiscal austerity requirements. We do not believe this will
ultimately be successful, and expect that the crisis will spread to
other euro nations.
To intensify scare tactics, deficit hawks use Greece as an
example of what awaits the United States if it doesn’t tighten its
fiscal belt. But in doing this, the hawks fail to distinguish between
a nonsovereign (Greece) and sovereign (United States) country.
We agree that the concern about Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece,
and Spain (PIIGS) and other euro countries is justified. But con-
sidering the PIIGS as analogous to the United States is a result of
the failure of deficit critics to understand the differences between
the monetary arrangements of sovereign and nonsovereign
nations. Greece is a user, not an issuer, of the euro. In that respect,
it is more like California or even Orange County, both of which
are users of the dollar. It is a serious mistake to argue that a sov-
ereign nation like the United States should be constrained in the
same manner as Greece or Orange County.
Eurozone countries have faced two types of problems. First,
they have given up their monetary sovereignty by abandoning
their national currencies and adopting a supranational one. And
by divorcing fiscal and monetary authorities, they have relin-
quished their public sector’s capacity to provide high levels of
employment and output. Nonsovereign countries are limited in
their ability to spend according to taxation and bond revenues,
and this applies perfectly well to Greece, Portugal, and countries
like Germany and France. No U.S. state has a budget deficit or
debt ratio relative to GDP that comes close to that of Germany,
let alone that of Greece or Italy, even with the devastating recession
that is killing state budgets, yet they are already meeting market
resistance to new borrowing precisely because they are nonsover-
eign. We suspect that eurozone countries have been allowed to
exceed the limits imposed by markets on U.S. states because there
is some market uncertainty about the nature of these countries.
Are they nonsovereign? Will their neighbors rescue them? Will the
European Central Bank (ECB) or International Monetary Fund
(IMF) rescue individual nations? The answers seem more clear in
the case of the U.S. states: neighboring states will not aid a default-
ing state, no international lender is going to intervene, and a full
federal government bailout is unlikely (while it is probable that
there would be some sort of rescue, debt would probably face at
least some haircut, and some holders might be excluded).
Second, the eurozone countries have agreed to abide by the
Maastricht Treaty, which restricts budget deficits to only 3 per-
cent of GDP and debt to 60 percent of GDP. Even if these coun-
tries are able to borrow and finance their deficit spending (e.g.,
Germany and France), they are bound not to use fiscal policy
above those limits. In response, countries have resorted to differ-
ent means in keeping their national economies afloat—fostering
the export sector (in the case of Germany) or cooking books
through Wall Street wizardry (Greece). These constraints have
proven to be flexible, but that does not mean they do not matter.
When a nation exceeds mandated limits, it faces punishment by
European institutions and by markets. There is competition
within the eurozone for ratings, with Germany usually winning
and enjoying lower credit default swap pricing that allows it to
issue euro debt at a lower interest rate. That in turn lowers its
interest spending and deficits in a nice, virtuous cycle. Countries
such as Greece that exceed the limits the most are punished with
high interest rates that drive them into a vicious death spiral,
with further credit downgrades and higher interest rates as
deficits continue to rise. 
Although the “Greek tragedy” should be a real concern, all
of the proposed solutions share the same flaws that spring from
a mistaken understanding of how public finance works in sov-
ereign nations. Germany, France and the IMF have agreed to help
Greece if it becomes more responsible in balancing its budget
and retiring its debt (the details are not yet known). Greece is
therefore forced to cut its budget deficit in a recession, which
could worsen the eurozone’s situation since it grew by only 0.1
percent in the fourth quarter of 2009. Greece will try to reduce
its deficit by cutting public sector wages and pensions, a step that
would further exacerbate the problem by decreasing incomes and
employment. Indeed, there is no guarantee that fiscal austerity will
actually reduce the deficit, since slower growth will reduce tax rev-
enue in another vicious cycle. As the eurozone stagnates, members
such as Portugal, Italy, and Spain could face the same situation asPublic Policy Brief, No. 111 18
Greece. And so it goes. It is important to realize that even Germany
and France are threatened: Germany because it relies on exports to
other eurozone members to keep up its employment, and France
because its banks are major creditors of the PIIGS.
There are two real solutions for Greece and other eurozone
members. First, members could exit the eurozone, regain mone-
tary sovereignty, and run budget deficits that are large enough to
achieve full employment. They would have to default on their
euro-denominated debt because it would become even more dif-
ficult to service the debt in euros (especially if trade sanctions were
slapped on the countries that leave). By doing so, individual coun-
tries would regain control of domestic policy space and spend like
the United States—by crediting bank accounts. This option would
relieve the newly sovereign governments from being at the mercy
of markets, rating agencies, and other countries, and enable them
to fully utilize their labor resources. There would be, however, tran-
sitional costs—including possible sanctions placed on them by
other nations, as well as political and market uncertainty. 
The second and preferred solution to help all eurozone
countries facing default is to create a supranational fiscal author-
ity similar to the U.S. Treasury that is able to spend like a sover-
eign government. Alternatively, countries could be allowed to
have overdrafts in their ECB accounts that enable them to spend
euros like a sovereign government. Warren Mosler (2010) has
proposed a viable stopgap measure whereby the ECB would cre-
ate and distribute one trillion euros among members on a per
capita basis so that each individual country could regain control
over spending. This measure would give Euroland the time to
come up with a more permanent solution, such as creating a
supranational treasury that could spend as much as 10 or 15 per-
cent of the region’s GDP (the European Parliament’s budget is cur-
rently less than 1 percent of GDP, which is far too small to generate
a sufficient level of aggregate demand). Again, the distribution of
spending could be decided by individual member states. 
More generally, the failure to distinguish sovereign govern-
ment debt from nonsovereign government debt and the debt of
households and firms calls into question the results of another
Reinhart and Rogoff study (2009b), which lumps together gov-
ernment and private debt, and argues that a private or public
debt buildup poses systemic risks. While we agree that an exces-
sive private debt buildup is unsustainable, the same cannot be
said about sovereign government debt. It therefore makes no
sense to add these debts together. Also, we need to clearly distin-
guish between foreign- and domestic-denominated debts. A sov-
ereign government’s debt denominated in its own currency can-
not be subject to default risk nor can it cause slow growth, as it
represents the nongovernment sector’s net financial wealth. Many
have claimed that the Reinhart and Rogoff studies (2009a, 2009b)
demonstrate that high debt ratios lead to slow economic growth.
Yet, if sovereign government debt is a private sector asset, it is
highly implausible to argue that putting more wealth into the
hands of the nongovernment sector will generate slow growth.
The Reinhart and Rogoff studies fail to adequately distin-
guish between countries operating with different monetary
regimes, and this distinction must be made when having a mean-
ingful discussion about government finances. For example, their
analysis doesn’t distinguish between sovereign countries (e.g.,
the United States and the UK) and countries that have given up
their monetary sovereignty (e.g., the eurozone). Moreover, many
countries changed their monetary system over the period (liter-
ally, centuries) covered by the Reinhart and Rogoff studies. In
the United States, for example, one cannot compare the period
before and after 1973 as if nothing had changed. And for many
countries, the dataset goes back to the early 19th century, when
they were still on the gold standard and, hence, not sovereign (in
our definition). The Reinhart and Rogoff studies may apply to
the UK before the 1930s (when it was still on the gold standard),
but they don’t apply today. Therefore, their finding that debt
ratios above 90 percent of GDP are correlated with lower growth
is not applicable to sovereign nations, since it seems to be driven
by aggregating countries on a gold standard (or similar fixed
exchange rate) with those that are sovereign (and issue their own
floating-rate currency). Frankly, given the obvious confusion and
conflation over different types of debt (sovereign government,
nonsovereign government, and nongovernment), we cannot find
any conclusions that are relevant to the current U.S. situation. 
As explained earlier, the U.S. federal government budget
moves countercyclically, so that low growth causes the budget
deficit to expand. No doubt this response explains some of the
correlation reported by Reinhart and Rogoff—that high debt
ratios are associated with lower economic growth—but the cau-
sation is reversed for a sovereign nation, with slow growth caus-
ing deficits and raising debt ratios. In the case of a nonsovereign
government, large deficits probably cause slow growth due to the
imposition of austerity policies that are normally required for
nations operating fixed exchange rates. This is the disadvantage
of operating without a sovereign currency: both policymakers as
well as markets will impose high interest rates on nonsovereignLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
debt, and policymakers will probably try to raise taxes and cut
spending to protect the currency peg. These policies lower
growth but increase budget deficits (due to high interest rates
and low growth) and generate the empirical correlation found
in the study. 
Further, it is conceivable that an expansion fueled by private
sector debt will be followed by a period of low growth when pri-
vate spending is depressed, since households and firms try to
reduce debt ratios through increased savings. Given all of these
complexities, the finding that debt ratios above 90 percent of
GDP are correlated with lower economic growth provides no
guidance for policymakers, especially those in sovereign nations.
Moreover, the 90 percent ratio is rather an arbitrary number.
The debt thresholds selected by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) are
based on their “interpretation of much of the literature and pol-
icy discussion.” So far, however, no economist or policymaker
has been able to come up with a nonarbitrary number for the
debt-to-GDP ratio that has some economic meaning. The reason
is that there is no such magic number applicable to all countries
at all times. As discussed above, the government deficit (and
debt) has to equal the balance of the private sector, which is based
on its preference to save and import. It therefore varies among
countries and between time periods. 
Conclusion: The Role of Ideology
The hysteria about government deficits comes from a flawed
understanding of how the monetary system works. It is ques-
tionable how much of this is ideological and how much is really
a misunderstanding. Sovereign governments are led to believe
that they need to issue bonds and collect taxes to finance gov-
ernment spending, and that good policies should be judged in
terms of fiscal austerity. Mainstream economics has guided pol-
icymakers to impose artificial constraints on fiscal policy and
government finances, such as issuing bonds in response to
deficits, setting debt ceilings, forbidding the central bank to buy
treasury debt directly, and allowing markets to set interest rates
on government bonds. To further dupe the public, a strong case is
made for independent monetary policy and separating monetary
authority from fiscal authority in order to reduce the influence of
political pressures. All of these constraints are self-imposed and
voluntary.
Ideologically motivated economists have praised the merits
of monetary policy in controlling inflation by declaring that
price stability is all that is necessary to stabilize the economy.
They leave little room for stabilizing fiscal policy in their mod-
els. They warn the public that government spending causes infla-
tion, and that if budget deficits are not controlled, we could
become the next Zimbabwe (the most recent example of hyper-
inflation) or the Weimar Republic (Germany in the 1930s). The
historical context and case specifics are ignored, while the pre-
sumption that such analogies to failed states or household
budget constraints is sufficient. Proposals supporting deficit
spending as a means of dealing with economic crises are met
with warnings that government debt will burden future genera-
tions with high taxes. This implies that it is better to pay for our
excesses now than to pass along our problems to our grandchil-
dren. Moreover, concerns about government deficits and debts
have masked the real issue: deficit hawks are unwilling to allow
a (democratic) government to work for the good of the people. 
We accept that there are real differences of opinion regard-
ing the proper role of government in the economy. Some would
like to see the functions of government curtailed; others would
like to see them expanded. These are legitimate political stances.
What is not legitimate is to use fear over deficits to restrain gov-
ernment from achieving the public purpose that is democrati-
cally approved. A debate that is freed from the constraints
imposed by myths about how government really spends would
allow us to move forward to gain consensus on the public pur-
pose the American people expect government to pursue.
Notes
1.  This is the total outstanding debt ratio. The relevant figure is
the portion held by the public, which reaches only 73 percent.
2.  We will not revisit the wisdom of such a scheme but merely
argue that for all intents and purposes, Social Security’s
Treasury holdings really amount to internal record keep-
ing—a reminder that Social Security, taken alone, runs sur-
pluses now, and that the Treasury will have to cover Social
Security’s shortfall someday. Yet that has nothing to do with
the overall budget stance of the federal government, which
can be balanced or in surplus or deficit regardless of the bal-
ance of individual federal government programs.
3.  There is the belief that the debt owned by Social Security
should be counted because it reflects a future obligation of
government to future beneficiaries. However, the govern-
ment is compelled to meet those obligations whether or notPublic Policy Brief, No. 111 20
Social Security owns Treasuries, and it will meet its obliga-
tions in exactly the same manner whether or not it holds
Treasuries (see Wray 2005).
4.  This can also be looked at in terms of the leakage-injection
approach: budget deficits as well as domestic private deficits
are injections that must equal the leakage of current account
deficits. Given the propensity for net imports and the federal
government’s surplus, the domestic private sector’s deficit
must be that much larger to match the leakages due to cur-
rent account deficits plus the government surplus.
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